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6	UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT	
7	EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA SACRAMENTO DIVISION	
8	SACRAMENIO DIVISION	
9		Case No. 11-26987-E-13L
10	In re )	Case NO. 11-2090/-E-13L
11	STEPHEN E. FLEURY and ) ELIZABETH M. MAGALLON-FLEURY, )	
12	Debtor(s).	
13	STEPHEN E. FLEURY and	Adv. Pro. No. 11-2198
14	ELIZABETH M. MAGALLON-FLEURY, )	
15	Plaintiff(s), ) v.	
16	SPECIALIZED LOAN SERVICING, )	
17	LLC; ARCH BAY HOLDINGS, LLC -) SERIES 2009B; MTC FINANCIAL, )	
18	INC.; and DOES 1-50, ) inclusive, )	
19	Defendant(s).	
20	)	
21	This memorandum decision is not approved for publication and may not be cited except when relevant under the doctrine of law of the case or the rules of claim preclusion or issue preclusion.	
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24	MEMORANDUM OPINION AND DECISION	
25	The court has been prese	nted with a Motion for Injunctive
26		n for a Temporary Restraining Order
27		lizabeth Magallon Fleury ("Debtor-
28	Plaintiffs"). The Motion was	electronically filed on March 22,

In the Motion, Debtor-Plaintiffs assert that Specialized 1 2011. Loan Servicing, LLC; Arch Bay Holdings, LLC -Series 2009B; and MTC 2 Financial, Inc. d/b/a Trustee Corps, the named Defendants, intend 3 to conduct a nonjudicial foreclosure sale at 12:30 p.m. on March 4 23, 2011, of real property commonly known as 10716 Cedar Avenue, 5 6 Grass Valley, California. The Cedar Avenue Property is listed on 7 Schedule A as real property owned by the Debtors with a value of \$495,000.00, which secures claims totaling \$652,899.46. (Schedule 8 A, No. 11-26987 Dckt. 16.) Schedule B filed by the Debtors does 9 10 not schedule any affirmative claims or causes of action as property 11 of the bankruptcy estate. Schedule D lists Specialized Loan Servicing as having a disputed secured claim in the amount of 12 13 \$652,899.46 secured by the Cedar Avenue Property.

Over the past eighteen months, the Debtor-Plaintiffs have repeatedly sought the protections of the Bankruptcy Code. After receiving a Chapter 7 discharge, the Debtor-Plaintiffs filed a series of unsuccessfully prosecuted Chapter 13 cases,<sup>1</sup> in which one could surmise that their sole apparent goal was to gain the protections of the automatic stay.

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<sup>1</sup> In their current bankruptcy petition, the Debtor-Plaintiffs neglect to disclose Case No. 11-20516, which was filed on January 7, 2011, and dismissed on March 16, 2011.

1 Fleurys' Bankruptcy Petition History Since October 2009 2 Disposition Date Filed Disposition Case No. Reason Date 3 09-42665-C-7 Oct. 19, 2009 Discharged Jan. 25, 2010 4 Failure to File Plan Following 5 10-37632-E-13 July 5, 2010 Dec. 2, 2010 Dismissed Denial of Confirmation 6 Ineligibility -7 Failure to 11-20516-B-13 Jan 7, 2011 Mar. 16, 2011 Dismissed Complete 8 Prepetition Credit Counseling 9 11-26987-E-13 Mar. 22, 2011 Parent Bankruptcy Case - Pending 10

The court noted its concerns about the Fleurys' good faith basis for pursuing relief under Chapter 13 when it denied confirmation of their plan in the first Chapter 13 case:

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From the evidence presented, it is unclear to the court for what purpose Debtors filed the present Plan. The fails to provide for payment of any claims Plan Rather, it seems Debtors are attempting to whatsoever. use the Chapter 13 Plan, and the objection to the claim of Arch Bay Holdings, LLC, as a scheme to discharge the underlying perfected debt held by Accredited Home Lenders or its assigns. This is not permitted. 11 U.S.C. 1322(b)(2). From the totality of the circumstances, the court finds that the Plan was not offered in good faith. The Plan cannot be confirmed. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(3).

(Civ. Min., Sep. 14, 2010, No. 10-37632-E-13 Dckt. 38.)

The Motion for the Temporary Restraining Order merely states that the Debtor-Plaintiffs seek a temporary restraining order against unnamed Defendants pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65 and Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 7065. The Debtor-Plaintiffs fail to state with particularity the grounds upon which the requested relief is based. *See* Fed. R. Civ. P. 7(b) *incorporated by* Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7007. Failure to state grounds

- for the relief requested is a basis for denying the Motion. Given 1 2 the urgency of the Motion, the court has assembled the information 3 presumably the grounds for the Motion from Points and Authorities ("P&As") filed in support of the pleading titled "Motion." 4 5 From these P&As the court surmises the following grounds as the basis for the requested injunctive relief. 6 7 1. In a ruling in one of the Debtor-Plaintiffs' prior bankruptcy cases, Chapter 13 case No. 10-37632 "that [Defendants] had not established they were the real party in interest." This was 8 an order on an objection to proof of claim filed by Arch Bay 9 in that case. Debtor-Plaintiffs then contend that "Despite said ruling, Defendants have ignored the findings of fact and ruling and are doing an 'end around' attempting to conduct a non-judicial foreclosure." (P. & A. 1:25-28, 2:1-3.) 10 11 At this point in time, Defendants were unable to establish to 2. 12 the satisfaction of the judge that they have the authority to enforce the note and proceed with a foreclosure. (P. & A. 13 2:4-6.) The automatic stay in the prior case was "lifted by operation 14 3. of law due to technical errors unrelated to [the judge's] October 19, 2010 ruling. (P. & A. 2:6-7.) 15 16 4. Only by fraud and intentionally ignoring the judge's prior ruling are Defendants proceeding as they have done nothing to correct the deficiencies pointed out in the judge's ruling but 17 instead attempting to "quickly capitalize on the technical aspects of not having a stay in place." (P. & A. 2:9-12.) 18 19 5. The validity of the claim of Defendants that it has the right to foreclose on the Debtor-Plaintiffs' property is the issue 20 in this Adversary Proceeding. (P. & A. 2:7-9.) 21 6. For this reason, the court should issue the temporary restraining order. 22 The court has not stopped with the grounds as stated in this 23 24 portion of the P&As, but combed the balance of the pleadings to 25 fully understand the grounds being asserted by these Debtor-Plaintiffs. 26 It is contended that Defendant Arch Bay is not "a beneficiary under the note" and cannot foreclose under the deed of 27 28
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trust, based on the finding of the judge in the prior case.<sup>2</sup> 1 Further, MTC Financial, Inc. d/b/a Trustee Corps is not the trustee 2 of record under the deed of trust and cannot conduct a trustee's 3 sale. (P. & A. 3:18-23.) The trustee named under the deed of trust 4 is a company called "Accredited" and no substitution of trustee by 5 Accredited has been executed or presented to substitute MTC instead 6 7 of Steward Title. (The connection of Steward Title is not explained in the P&As.) 8

9 The Debtor-Plaintiffs then argue that the loan for which the note was issued is part of a securitized loan portfolio and that 10 assignments are governed by a Pooling and Servicing Agreement 11 (PSA). The P&As then proceed with the creation of securitized loan 12 13 portfolios and its business uses and that an REMIC trust into which 14 notes are transferred must comply with certain procedures to 15 maintain its tax status. The Debtor-Plaintiffs contend that the procedure has not been complied with if the Defendants are the 16 17 owners of the note. However, the Debtor-Plaintiffs do not provide 18 any basis for contending that any transfer of the Note to the Defendants is invalid under the Internal Revenue Code. 19

The Debtor-Plaintiffs then discuss the use of MERS (Mortgage Electronic Recording Systems, Inc.) as the nominee of the beneficiary under the deed of trust. Debtor-Plaintiffs contend that MERS, merely as the nominee, could not assigned any interest

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> The Points and Authorities does not address what is meant by stating that Arch Bay is not a "beneficiary" under the note. Under negotiable instrument law, one is commonly the payee, holder or assignee of a note, not the "beneficiary." The term "beneficiary" is commonly used in California law for the interests that one has under a deed of trust which secures a note - the creditor is named as the beneficiary in the deed of trust to secure an obligation.

1 in the note and deed of trust to Defendants.

2 The Debtor-Plaintiffs assert that they will suffer irreparable harm from a foreclosure because they will lose their home and may 3 be evicted. However, the discussion does not address the effect of 4 an attempted foreclosure if none of the Defendants had the right to 5 6 conduct a nonjudicial foreclosure sale. Further, if the Debtor-7 Plaintiffs are incorrect and the Defendants have the right to foreclose and obtain title to the real property, the Motion and 8 arguments do not offer any analysis of the harm to Defendants. 9

10 It is further asserted that the equities tip in favor of the 11 Debtor-Plaintiffs, since they would lose their home through a foreclosure sale (assuming that the sale is validly conducted). To 12 13 support this argument, the Debtor-Plaintiffs again rely heavily on 14 the ruling in the prior bankruptcy case on the objection to proof 15 of claim. They contend that maintaining the status quo of allowing 16 them to continue in possession of the Cedar Avenue Property pending 17 resolution of the Adversary Proceeding is proper. If after the 18 litigation is completed it is determined that the Debtor-Plaintiffs are incorrect, the Defendants can foreclose at that time. 19 It is 20 further contended that the public interest supports granting these 21 Debtor-Plaintiffs the injunctive relief. It is suggested that this 22 court should be particularly wary of the potential for 23 (unidentified) "organized crime" and foreclosure mills creating "bogus documents." 24

The only evidence submitted in support of the Motion is the declaration of Richard Hall, the attorney for the Debtor-Plaintiffs in this adversary proceeding, current bankruptcy case, and prior bankruptcy cases. He testifies that his office "continuously

monitors the foreclosure sale dates and postponements for 1 2 foreclosure sales scheduled for those of my clients whose 3 properties are in foreclosure." (Decl. of Richard Hall 2:1-3, Dckt. 7.) As part of this continuous process, he ascertained that 4 a foreclosure sale for the Cedar Avenue Property was scheduled for 5 12:30 p.m. on March 23, 2011. No explanation is provided in the 6 7 declaration for why no action was taken by the Debtor-Plaintiffs until the day before the scheduled sale or when, as part of the 8 continuous monitoring of foreclosure sale when he learned of the 9 10 March 23, 2011 sale. Additionally, no evidence is submitted as to when Mr. Hall and the Debtor-Plaintiffs first knew of the March 23, 11 2011 foreclosure sale. 12

## Allegations in the Complaint

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14 The court has reviewed the complaint in this adversary proceeding, Docket Entry No. 1. The Complaint alleges numerous 15 16 affirmative monetary claims against the Defendants. These include: 17 Fraudulent Concealment, Negligence Per Se, Negligence, Intentional 18 Infliction of emotional distress, Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress, Unfair Business Practices (Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200 19 20 et. seq.), and RICO claims. In reviewing Schedule B filed by the 21 Debtors, no such claims are listed as existing as of the March 22, 22 2011 commencement of the latest Chapter 13 case.

## RULING

The Debtor-Plaintiffs appears to have staked his case on contentions and allegations which have nothing to do with his performance on the Note - making the payments promised for the monies borrowed. Additionally, they place great reliance on the ruling on the Objection to Claim in their prior Chapter 13

1 bankruptcy case. In doing so, they ignore the clear language in 2 the ruling and Civil Minutes which are the court's findings of fact 3 and conclusions of law. The court's actual ruling states,

IT IS ORDERED that the objection to Proof of Claim number 1 of Arch Bay Holdings, LLC is sustained and the claim is disallowed in its entirety, without prejudice to the person who holds such claim and interest securing the claim.

7 (No. 10-37632 Dckt. 45 (emphasis added).)

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The Civil Minutes, Docket Entry No. 44 in case no. 10-37632, 8 state that the disallowance of the claim "does not remove any lien 9 10 from the Debtors' property or prejudice the rights of any person who is the owner of the obligation and interest securing the 11 obligation." As stated in the Civil Minutes, the ruling was based 12 13 on Arch Bay not having included with the proof of claim any 14 documents evidencing the transfer of the note from Alternative Financing Corporation to Arch Bay. There was no ruling that Arch 15 Bay did not own the note or could not enforce any liens securing 16 17 the note. It could well be that Arch Bay is such "person who holds such claim and interest securing the claim" as referenced in the 18 order. 19

In granting or denying a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction the court applies a five-element test. In this case the court determines that Debtor-Plaintiffs have not shown the basis for issuing a temporary restraining order: Likelihood of success on the merits.

The Debtor-Plaintiffs have failed to show a a. likelihood of success on the merits. They misread and misapply the court's ruling in the prior case. Further, argument they spend much of their attacking the securitized loan portfolio business and whether or not the Internal Revenue Code has been complied with by other parties. However, no consideration is made by the Debtor-Plaintiffs of the effect of an improper

foreclosure sale being conducted by persons who have no right under the promissory note and deed of trust. The Debtor-Plaintiffs offer no explanation of the status of the loan, their performance thereunder, and to the extent that there is a default how they intend to cure the default through a Chapter 13 plan. The Debtors offer no evidence for the factual contentions to support the Motion. Rather, there is merely a declaration of their attorney saying that a foreclosure sale is pending.

2. Debtor-Plaintiffs 6 Substantial threat that will suffer irreparable harm if the injunction is denied. They have not 7 provided the court with any explanation as to the effect of the foreclosure sale if they are correct and Defendants have no right to conduct such a sale. Moreover, Debtor-Plaintiffs 8 provide no explanation of how they are able to pay the 9 obligation secured by the property and how they can prosecute a successful plan in this Chapter 13 case.

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- 3. The Debtor-Plaintiffs fail to show that threatened injury outweighs to them any damage the injunction may cause to 11 Defendants. No discussion or analysis is provided about the 12 prior bankruptcy cases which were dismissed, the payments made on the debt secured by the property, any account set up into 13 which the payments due on the note have been deposited pending resolution of any dispute, or how the Debtor-Plaintiffs will compensate the Defendants for loss caused by further delay. 14 the Debtor-Plaintiffs do not address the Additionally, 15 property rights and interests of Defendants in the Cedar Avenue Property.
- Finally, the Debtor-Plaintiffs have failed to show that the 4. 17 injunction will serve the public interest. These Debtor-Plaintiffs have filed multiple bankruptcy case and received the benefit of the automatic stay. Due to the repeat filings, 18 no automatic stay exists in this case. 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(4). Congress enacted this provision for a reason, and merely 19 filing an adversary proceeding saying now, after many months 20 of prior proceedings, the Debtor-Plaintiffs want to litigate issues with the claim holders is inconsistent with the reasonable rights and interest Congress sought to protect. 21 No explanation has been given as to why, 24 hours prior to the foreclosure sale, the Debtor-Plaintiffs are now running to 22 court for an injunction. 23
- See Sugar Busters, LLC. v. Brennan, 177 F.3d 258, 265 (5th Cir. 1999); National Steel Car, Ltd. v. Canadian Pac. Ry. Ltd., 357 F.3d 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2004). The Debtor-Plaintiffs have also failed to establish the right to a temporary restraining order under the alternative test discussed by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in
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Stuhlbarg International Sales, Co., Inc. v. John D. Brush & Co., Inc., 240 F.3d 832, 839-840 (9th Cir. 2001). The public interest, given the facts in this case and bankruptcies filed by the Debtor-Plaintiffs does not weigh in favor of a temporary restraining order in this case.

Further, there is no evidence presented to the court that the Debtor-Plaintiffs have the ability to provide the security which the court would require pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(d). Merely because parties who are well aware of a potential dispute wait until the very last minute to request injunctive relief does not automatically waive the requirement to provide security. 

The Motion for Temporary Restraining Order is denied. Dated: March 23, 2011 By the Court

/s/ Ronald H. Sarqis RONALD H. SARGIS, Judge United States Bankruptcy Court